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Summary 
We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each 
participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that 
abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, 
i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we 
assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We 
show that for a second-best agreement, marginal costs of abatement should exceed the 
Pigovian level. Moreover, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries in the 
second-best quota agreement with heterogeneous countries. In other words, the second-
best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable. 
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1  Introduction 
The Coase theorem suggests that tradable emission quotas will yield efficiency, regardless of 
the initial allocation of quotas. The reason is that (small) cost minimizing agents will provide 
cost-effectiveness by trading until all differences in marginal abatement costs between sources 
are eliminated. Trade in emission quotas is beneficial both nationally, in trade between 
households and producers, and internationally, in trade between governments, if an 
international agreement regulates emissions of greenhouse gases through quotas. The Kyoto 
agreement is an example of such an agreement, as the participating countries are - with some 
restrictions - allowed to trade in quotas. The EU quota trading scheme, designed to help 
achieve the EU countries’ Kyoto commitments, also allows quota trade among firms located 
in different EU countries. 
 
A condition for quota trade being beneficial is that imperfections elsewhere in the economy 
are unaffected by trade in quotas. Otherwise, trade in emission quotas might enhance the 
efficiency losses associated with the market imperfections. In fact, the welfare benefits of 
trade in the quota market might then be outweighed by welfare losses in other markets, i.e. 
quota trade could lower welfare.  
 
The present paper focuses on trade versus no trade within the context in which countries have 
joined an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating 
country. Unlike most models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by 
R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are 
endogenous. More specifically, the abatement costs of each firm are affected by this firm’s 
own R&D investments as well as to some extent R&D investments by all other (domestic and 
foreign) firms. Hence, in addition to the negative environmental externality between 
countries, there is a positive externality due to technology spillovers between firms.  
 
According to standard economic theory, an international climate agreement should address 
both of these externalities in order to achieve the first-best outcome. However, neither the 
Kyoto agreement nor the EU quota scheme includes elements related to R&D investments.
1 
The international climate agreement we examine in this paper therefore does not include R&D 
                                                 
1 Possible reasons for why R&D policies are not included are discussed briefly in Golombek and Hoel (2006). 
There is a small but rapidly growing literature discussing how international climate agreements might include 
R&D policies, see e.g. Barrett (2006), Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2005).   3
policies. This shortcoming of the international agreement represents an imperfection, which 
might imply that welfare is lower when quota trade is permitted than when it is not.  
  
Our paper builds on Golombek and Hoel (2006), which focused on international climate 
agreements where each country receives emission quotas and the agreement does not include 
R&D policies. Assuming identical countries, it was shown that marginal costs of abatement 
should exceed the Pigovian level. The present paper extends Golombek and Hoel (2006) to 
the case of heterogeneous countries.  
 
Countries might differ in several ways. In the present paper we focus on differences in size, 
which is one of the most important differences. As in Golombek and Hoel (2006) we find that 
the second-best optimum is characterized by marginal costs of abatement exceeding the 
Pigovian level in all countries. This result is related to the fact that R&D policies are not 
included in the climate agreement. Each country will then ignore technology spillovers to 
other countries, and thus tend to choose an R&D policy (formally in our model: an R&D 
subsidy) that gives less R&D than what is socially optimal. In designing the second-best 
agreement, the group of all countries takes into account that the stricter the emission 
requirement, the more R&D investments a country will undertake in the next stage. Setting 
emission requirements so strict that marginal abatement costs exceed the Pigovian level is 
thus a way to (partly) compensate for the domestic R&D subsidy being too low.  
 
An important new finding in the present paper is that marginal costs of abatement will 
generally differ between countries in a second-best optimum. To achieve the second-best 
optimum quotas must therefore be distributed in a specific manner among countries, and 
countries should not be allowed to change this quota distribution through quota trade. We 
show that it is not obvious whether marginal abatement costs should be highest in small or 
large countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a formal model with 
identical firms located in two countries of different sizes. For all firms, abatement costs 
depend both on the technology level of the firm and the level of abatement. The technology 
level of a firm depends on its own R&D investments as well as all other firms’ R&D 
investments. In each country the government may influence R&D investments through a 
domestic R&D subsidy.    4
 
Section 3 examines the first-best social optimum, i.e. the levels of abatement and R&D 
investments in each firm that minimize total social costs. The first-best outcome could be 
implemented through an ideal international agreement that sets a common carbon tax to be 
used in all countries, as well as a common subsidy rate for R&D investments for all firms in 
both countries. 
 
In Section 4 we study the optimal design of an international climate agreement under the 
restriction that the agreement does not contain R&D policy elements. We assume that the 
climate agreement is designed by the group of all countries such that total social costs are 
minimized, given how each government will respond to the climate agreement, and how firms 
will respond to the climate agreement and to the policies chosen by national governments. 
Each government determines its domestic technology subsidy such that total social costs of 
the country are minimized, given the emission quotas it receives (determined through the 
international agreement) and how firms will respond in the final stage. We refer to the 
international climate agreement as second-best as it has been designed under the restriction 
not to contain R&D policy elements. This restriction implies that the second-best agreement is 
unable to mimic the first-best optimum.  
 
As mentioned above, we show that the second-best optimum is characterized by marginal 
costs of abatement exceeding the Pigovian level in both countries, and that marginal costs of 
abatement should generally differ across countries. Hence, if countries are free to trade in 
quotas under a second-best quota agreement, total welfare will be reduced as trade will 
typically reduce the initial differences in the country-specific marginal costs of abatement 
(and eliminate all differences in the competitive case). Whether or not trade in quotas will 
improve efficiency depends on the initial allocation of quotas in a real climate agreement 
relative to the second-best allocation. As a rule of thumb, trade in quotas is less likely to 
improve efficiency the closer the initial allocation is to the second-best allocation. Under the 
second-best quota agreement, quotas should not be tradable.  
 
In Section 5 we discuss various extensions of our model. In particular, we argue that our main 
results hold also when there are other differences between countries than size. Finally, in 
Section 6 we summarize our main findings. 
   5
2  The model  
We use a static framework in which all types of uncertainties are disregarded. Moreover, we 
consider the case of only two countries (domestic and foreign). There are m+m* identical 
firms in the economy, with m located in the domestic country and m* in the foreign country. 
The only difference between the two countries is their size, represented by the number of 
firms. Henceforth, we assume that the domestic county is the larger of the two, i.e. 
* mm > . In 
Section 5 we discuss the implications of other possible differences between countries. 
 
All firms invest in R&D and, to simplify, we disregard patents. While technology spillovers 
allow all other firms to benefit from a firm’s R&D investments, technology diffusion is not 
perfect. For any firm, only part (01 γ << ) of other firms’ R&D investments are beneficial.  
 
We assume that the technology level of a particular domestic firm (Y ) depends on its own 
R&D investments ( X ), the amount of R&D investments of the other firms in the same 
country (x), and the amount of R&D investments of firms in the other country (
* x ): 
 
 
** (1 ) YX m x m x γ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − + ⎣ ⎦ (1) 
 
In (1) we have assumed an additive structure of technology spillovers, i.e. the technology 
level of a firm depends on the sum of all firms’ R&D investments, corrected by the 
technology diffusion parameters (γ ). This is the standard way of modeling spillovers, and 
dates back at least to Spence (1984).
2 The technology level of a particular foreign firm (
* Y ) is 
correspondingly given by 
 
 
** * * (1 ) YX m x m x γ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − + ⎣ ⎦ (2) 
 
With identical firms, BAU emissions are equal across firms, and normalized to 1. Let A,  a 
and 
* a  be abatement in a particular domestic firm, in the other domestic firms and in foreign 
firms respectively. For domestic firms, emissions are then given by 1 a − .  
 
                                                 
2 In the context of international environmental problems a similar assumption has been used by e.g. van der 
Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994), Xepapadeas (1995),  Katsoulacos (1997) and Rosendahl (2004).    6
For all firms, abatement costs are assumed to depend both on the level of abatement and the 
technology level of the firm. Hence, for domestic firms, costs of abatement are represented by 
(,) cay. We assume that the function  ( , ) cay is twice differentiable and has the following 
properties:  (0, ) 0 cy = , (0, ) 0 a cy =  and  (1, ) a cy = ∞. Moreover, for  0 a >  we have  0 a c > , 
0 aa c > ,  0 y c < ,  0 yy c > ,  0 ay c <  , 
2 () 0 aa yy ay cc c − >  and  ( ,0) y ca −  being sufficiently large to 
avoid corner solutions. 
 
In the following analysis, we shall assume that emissions in each country are set through the 
international agreement. With identical firms in each country, emissions levels per firm are 
thus 1/m and 1/m* of the exogenously set abatement levels for the domestic and foreign 
country, respectively. The only variable chosen by each firm is R&D investments. The price 
of R&D investments is normalized to one. We assume, however, that the domestic 
government subsidizes R&D investments by the rate σ  (and the governments abroad 
subsidize R&D investments by the rate 
* σ ).  
 
A particular domestic firm minimizes its total costs by choosing R&D investments ( X ), 
taking R&D expenditures in all other firms as given, and also taking its abatement 
( 1/   Aa m == ) as given (set through the international agreement). Hence, the firm minimizes 
 
  (, ) ( 1 ) caY X σ + −  (3) 
 
The second term in (3) is net R&D expenditures, and the technology level Y is given by (1). 
All domestic firms solve a similar problem, and they will thus choose the same values in 
equilibrium ( X x =  and Yy = ). The first-order condition for this problem is thus given by:  
 
 (,) 1 y ca y σ −= −  (4) 
 
According to (4) marginal costs of R&D investments (1 σ − ) should equal marginal benefits 
of these investments ( 0 y c − > ). From (4) we see that the technology level of domestic firms y  
depends only on σ  and a, i.e. 
 
 (, ) yy a σ =  (5)   7
 







σ =− > . 
 
In equilibrium,  X x =  and Yy =  in the home country, whereas 
** X x =  and 
** Yy =  in the 
foreign country. Solving (1) and (2) for equilibrium values of x and 
* x , we obtain 
 
 
* x hy ky =+ (6) 
 
 
** ** x hy ky =+  (7) 
 
where (for 
* mm > ) 
* 0 hh >> and 
* 0 kk < < .
3 As countries differ in size, they might also 
have different environmental damage costs; a large country will, cet. par., suffer more from 
climate changes than a small country. We therefore let the environmental damage of the home 
country be 
** [( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] md m a m a −+ − , where d is the constant marginal damage per firm 
(proxy for size) and 
** [( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] ma m a −+ −  is total emissions. Correspondingly, the 
environmental damage of the foreign country is 
** * [( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] mdm a m a −+ − . 
 
3  The first-best social optimum 
The first-best social optimum is defined as the outcome that minimizes total social costs, that 
is, the sum of abatement costs, R&D expenditures and environmental costs. Since all firms are 
equal
4, the optimal outcome will be characterized by abatement levels and R&D expenditures 
being equal in all firms. The first-best optimum is thus found by minimizing 
 
  } {
** () ( , )[ () ( 1 ) ] mm c a y xdmm a ++ + + −  (8) 
 
                                                 


















































4 In addition to abatement cost functions being identical across firms, the technology spillovers are the same for 
all firms: The diffusion parameter between firms in the same country is assumed equal to the diffusion parameter 
between firms in different countries. We return to this assumption in Section 5. 
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with respect to abatement and technology levels in the two countries, subject to (6) and 
* y y = . The first-order condition with respect to abatement is 
 
 
* (,) ( ) a ca y mmd =+  (9) 
 
Hence, marginal abatement costs should be equalized across firms, and the common value 
should be equal to the sum of marginal environmental costs of the two countries. 
  
The first-order condition with respect to the technology level is  
 
 
*1 (,) [ 1 ( 1 ) ] y ca y hk mm γ
− −= + = + + −  (10) 
 
Using (4) the technology subsidy in both countries should be  
 
 
*1 1( )1[ 1 ( 1 ) ]
F hk mm σγ




4  The second-best quota agreement 
We now turn to pure quota agreements, i.e. agreements specifying emission quotas but not 
containing any elements related to R&D investments. We assume that both countries have 
signed an international climate agreement that specifies the distribution of emission quotas 
between countries. Finally, we assume that the agreement is second-best, i.e. the group of 
signatories determines the amount of emission quotas assigned to each country such that total 
social costs - aggregated over all identical firms in both countries - are minimized subject to 
behavioral restrictions on firms and governments.  
 
For a given amount of emission quotas, i.e. given abatement level a, a country’s choice of a 
technology subsidy σ  is equivalent to choosing a technology level y (see (5)). While σ  is the 
actual choice variable of the government, for mathematical simplicity we will use y as the 
choice variable. For a given amount of emission quotas, the domestic country thus minimizes  
 
 [(, ) ] mcay x +  (12) 
   9
with respect to its own technology level, subject to the technology constraint (6) and taking 
the technology subsidy (and thus the technology level) abroad as given. The first-order 
condition is given by  
 
 (,) y ca y h − =  (13) 
 
Hence, the marginal benefits of R&D investments when (only) domestic spillovers are taken 
into account should equal marginal costs of R&D investments (
1 1 y ch
− − = ). Using (4), the 
optimal technology level in each country can be implemented through the subsidies  
 
 1




Q h σ = −  (15) 
 
We have previously shown that 
* hh >  since 
* mm > . Hence, the largest country will have the 
highest subsidy as increased technology level in this country benefits more firms 
domestically: 
 
Proposition 1: In a quota agreement the equilibrium technology subsidy will be highest in the 
largest country. 
 
Moreover, since k  and 
* k  are negative a comparison of (14) and (15) with (11) gives the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: In a quota agreement the technology subsidy in both countries will be lower 
than in the first-best optimum.  
 
The results above hold for any quota agreement. We now turn to the second-best optimal 
design of a quota agreement. From (5), (14) and (15) it follows that ( , )
Q yy a σ =  and 
** * (, )
Q yy a σ = . The group of all countries chooses the level of abatement for each country so 
that total social costs are minimized. We find the optimal amounts of abatement by 
minimizing (8) with respect to abatement in the two countries (a and 
* a ), taking into account 
(6), (7),  ( , )
Q yy a σ =  and 
** * (, )





(1 )[1 ( 1)]








  * *
*
* () 0
(1 )[1 ( 1)]








where we have used (13). According to (16) and (17), for each country marginal costs of 
abatement should exceed the sum of marginal environmental costs. Hence, we have the 
following proposition:   
 
Proposition 3: The abatement levels in a second-best quota agreement are set so that for each 
country, the price of carbon (i.e. the marginal abatement cost) exceeds the sum of marginal 
environmental costs. 
 
The intuition behind this result follows from the equilibrium subsidy under the second-best 
quota agreement being lower than the first-best subsidy (Proposition 2). The difference 
reflects the fact that each country neglects the international technology spillovers arising from 
its own R&D investments. Since the optimal technology level is increasing in abatement 
(0 a y > ), in our model increased abatement provides an incentive to increase R&D 
expenditures. Hence, collective rationality suggests having a “high” level of abatement (“few” 
quotas) in order to increase domestic R&D, thus (partly) compensating for the domestic R&D 




a my generally differs from  * a my , it follows from (16) and (17) that marginal costs of 
abatement will generally differ across countries in a second-best optimum. As a competitive 
international quota market equalizes marginal costs of abatement across countries, we have 
the following proposition:  
  
Proposition 4: In a second-best quota agreement marginal costs of abatement will generally 
differ across countries. Hence, if all countries receive the second-best amount of quotas, there 
should be no trade in quotas across countries. 
   11
It is not obvious whether marginal abatement costs should be highest in the small or in the 
large country. On the one hand, (16) and (17) suggest that marginal costs of abatement should 
be highest in the smallest country (
* mm > ). The interpretation is that more of the total 
spillovers accrue to foreign firms when R&D is undertaken in a small country than in a large 
country. Marginal abatement costs should therefore be larger the smaller a country is, thereby 
providing extra incentives for small countries to increase their R&D expenditures. On the 
other hand, the sign of  * aa cc −  depends also on  a y  and  * a y . The larger these derivatives are, 
the more will R&D expenditures in the two countries increase as a response to increased 
abatement. The stronger the effect, the larger is the social gain of increasing the abatement 
level beyond the level given by the first-best rule. Unless  a y σ  and  ** a y
σ  are zero, the 
derivatives  a y  and  * a y  depend on the size of the subsidies, and we know from Proposition 1 
that the R&D subsidy is highest in the largest country. Although we know the ranking of the 
subsidies, the ranking of the derivatives  a y  and  * a y  depends on third-order derivatives of the 
abatement cost function (see the discussion after (5)). It is therefore not obvious whether 
marginal abatement costs should be highest in the small or in the large country. 
 
5  Extensions  
In the analysis we have assumed that the location of firms has no bearing on the technology 
spillovers between them. One could, however, argue that spillovers between firms in the same 
country are larger than spillovers between firms located in different countries as the benefits 
from spillovers might declinine with distance, see e.g. Keller (2002). If we instead had 
assumed that the diffusion parameter between firms in different countries was smaller than the 
diffusion parameter between firms in the same country, most of our results would remain 
valid. The one important difference would be that in this case the first-best technology 
subsidy should be highest in the largest country. The reason for this result is that R&D 
investments in a firm creates more positive externalities in the large country than in the small 
one (when the common domestic diffusion parameter exceeds the common international 
diffusion parameter) simply because there are more firms in the largest country. The 
conclusion that the carbon price should be the same across all firms in the first-best outcome 
remains valid, as do our results in Propositions 1-4.  
   12
Above, we assumed that countries differed only in size. Other possible differences would be 
different spillover parameters and different abatement cost functions. Introducing differences 
of this type would not change the property of the first-best outcome that marginal abatement 
costs should be equalized across firms. However, in general the first-best technology 
subsidies will differ across firms (and across firms in the same county if firms are not 
identical within countries). The relevant results regarding the second-best quota agreement, 
given by Propositions 2-4, remain valid.  
 
One difference between countries that will not change any results is differences in marginal 
environmental costs: If these are d and d* per firm for the two countries (instead of d in both), 
(* ) mmd +  is simply replaced by ( * *) md m d +  in the relevant formulas, but otherwise all our 
results remain unchanged. Finally, none of our results would be changed if we instead 
assumed two groups of countries, with countries within each group being identical. From the 
intuition of the results it is also clear that Propositions 1-4 are valid also for the case of several 
different countries.  
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of the present article has been to examine second-best quota agreements with no 
R&D elements. There are several important results. First, when countries differ in size, the 
equilibrium technology subsidy will be highest in the largest country (Proposition 1), and in 
both countries the equilibrium subsidy will be lower than what is socially optimal 
(Proposition 2). Second, the number of quotas should be determined so that in each country, 
the price of carbon exceeds the Pigovian level (Proposition 3). Finally, in the second-best 
quota agreement the price of carbon should differ across countries (Proposition 4).  
 
The last result, i.e. that marginal costs of abatement should differ across countries, implies 
that international trade in emission quotas should not be allowed in a second-best quota 
agreement. It is important to emphasize that this conclusion is based on the quota agreement 
being second-best. A second-best agreement requires detailed information from all countries 
(including estimates of diffusion parameters), and also that politicians are capable of 
implementing the second-best agreement. In the real world, the initial allocation of quotas in 
an approved climate agreement – for example the Kyoto agreement – might be far from being   13
second-best, and in that case it is an open question whether trade in quotas will improve 
welfare.   
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